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firming such obstacles. This is the reason why past modes of writing the history of philosophy should be discarded. The aberrations and irrelevances of philosophical thought, both historical and contemporary, are not recognized because the works do not reveal concretely the history of ideas. Conformity with the portrayed trend of history and astuteness in effecting a skilful junction of one's speculation with that trend, comes to be more of a test of the success of a philosophy than its relevance to the life about it and its fruitfulness in the guidance and enrichment of that life. The histories of philosophy do not adequately reveal how germane ideas may have been to the age in which they flourished, the limitations involved in this quality, nor how speedily they lost that quality after they had become abstracted from their several original settings and confirmed as zealously guarded traditions in a cloistered mental life. We fall into the two-fold error of regarding as sheer abstractions and perversities ideas that were concretely validated and accepted in their times, and, on the other hand, of regarding ideas that had grown to be abstractions—mere side-shows of the intellectual circus—as a preordained movement of thought. The problem concerning the number of angels that could dance on the point of a needle may leave us to day coldly indifferent. It would be well, however, if histories of philosophy were to show how and why the problem was once real and pressing. But not merely that. It would be helpful to learn how the problem ever became a matter of indifference—and then to take the lesson to heart. A history of philosophy that is neither an *a priori* organization of the materials, nor a handbook of facts, and is not, finally, a diffuse literary history of culture, should serve to mitigate these evils. It should help to free philosophical thought from over-respect for the past, to provoke a more forward-looking manner of thinking, and make history an aid and not an obstacle in the pursuit of wisdom.

ALBERT G. A. BALZ.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

“DUALISM IN ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY”

IT can not be often that a critic gives so much pleasant stimulation to the “critickee” as Dr. Grace de Laguna has given by her discussion under the above title in the issue of this JOURNAL dated November 7. I am well aware that my views need philosophical overhauling, since the habit of philosophical analysis has too long been laid aside by their author; and I have only gratitude for the philosopher who is kind enough to give them expert attention.

The difficulty which I find in fully profiting by Dr. de Laguna's criticism is that of understanding her own position. She rejects both the dualism of *The Animal Mind* and the "mechanistic behaviorism" which that dualism opposes; her own form of behaviorism is not as yet clear to me. Since she doubtless wrote her article in order to present just this conception, and since she usually writes with great clearness, my difficulty is no doubt due to my inexpertness in handling philosophical categories; but still it exists.

Dr. de Laguna's arguments against the view that in animals and in man there exists an inner aspect to behavior, an aspect which is directly accessible only to the introspection of each individual but whose nature may be inferred by other individuals on the principle of analogy, do not convince me any more than behavioristic arguments have ever convinced me. One of the points she urges is that all experimental investigation of alleged subjective states of mind involves standardizing objective conditions, and that "the phenomena thus investigated become in effect functions of the factors constituting the standardized conditions of the experiment." As the dualist would not hesitate to admit that subjective phenomena are functions of objective conditions, he would evidently fail to appreciate the force of this objection. He would, of course, maintain that some of the objective conditions of a psychological experiment, such as for instance the play of cortical associative tendencies, may best be ascertained by means of their subjective accompaniments as revealed by the subject's introspection. Nor would the dualist realize why Dr. de Laguna needed to occupy a page in showing that in actual procedure and in results the studies of a dualist and of a behaviorist in the field of comparative psychology are identical. Since we can obtain no introspections from animals, such a statement would appear to be self-evident: it is the interpretation of results that differs for the two types of workers.

It is in considering another argument of my critic that I feel the need of a better understanding of the position which she would have me substitute for that of dualism. She urges that the psychologist would never have reached the conception of anger, for example, as a distinct type of experience, on the basis of introspection alone; he would have been prevented from so doing by the fact that the term covers feelings and experiences that are subjectively different. "Cold still anger is a somewhat different feeling from hot passionate anger." Upon what basis, then, can such a conception be reached? There would seem to be two possibilities, so far as I can see. Either (1) anger denotes a series of behavior phenomena that are always called forth by the same objective conditions, or (2) it means a series

of behavior phenomena that always produce the same objective results, under which head their effect on an outside observer may be classed. But it is clear that on the one hand anger is called forth by very different objective conditions in different individuals, and on the other hand that it looks very different to an outside observer when noted in different individuals. I do not see where the behaviorist has any advantage here over the dualist, who says that "anger" means a class of experiences which, while they differ in the same individual at different times, all have certain common elements observable by his introspection; and that similar elements may be inferred to be present in other persons whose behavior shows certain resemblances to his own behavior when such feelings are present in his consciousness.

When Dr. de Laguna turns upon the behaviorists, and declares that even the dualistic arguments are preferable to "mechanistic behaviorism," I still fail to understand what her own non-mechanistic behaviorism is. She quotes with approval, as against the mechanistic behaviorists, my statement to the effect that if a physiologist could observe the nervous process that occurs in my cortex when I see red, or the contraction of the muscles that occurs when I say "red," he would observe nothing red about either. Now I meant to imply by this statement that red is something other than behavior: that it is essentially a subjective experience. Dr. de Laguna seems to mean, by approving the statement as opposed to mechanistic behaviorism, that there exists a form of behavior which is not either nervous action or muscular action. I can not guess what behavior, so interpreted, is.

Nor does the following passage enlighten me. Why, Dr. de Laguna asks, can not the behaviorist "assert of the subject's red, as the physical chemist asserts of the electrical charge of the ion, that it is a function of directly observable phenomena; in this case, of discriminative responses to a set of standardized conditions?" Indeed he can, I would reply, and so can the dualist. But the dualist has an advantage over the behaviorist in recognizing the fact that the subject's red can not only be inferred, but directly observed (by the subject himself). When the behaviorist says that my consciousness of blue is effectively only my movements when I say blue, the dualist replies, "It is true that these movements are all that you, another person, can react to when I get the sensation blue. But I can react either to my sensation blue, or to my own movements of reaction which you observe: I can observe them also, and my reaction to the sensation blue in my consciousness is something quite unlike my reaction when I observe my own reactive movements. Therefore,

judged even by the standard of their effects on the outside world, my sensation blue and my reaction to that sensation are two different phenomena." This argument, it seems to me, disposes of the ordinary behaviorist on his own ground: what effect it has on Dr. de Laguna's behaviorism I do not know, because I do not understand what her type of behaviorism really is.

MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN

VASSAR COLLEGE.

DOCTRINAL FUNCTIONS

PROFESSOR Keyser's article with this title¹ is so illuminating and so completely confirms certain suspicions I have long entertained, that I am tempted to draw some further corollaries from his doctrine, and to ask him whether they would not meet with his assent.

1. If, as he shows, a "postulate-system" requires interpretation and admits of more than *one*, and is therefore to be regarded as a "doctrinal function" of which the variables may be filled up variously by various persons, may we not trace this state of things elsewhere than in mathematics? Will it not follow that *any* "doctrine" which is laid down dogmatically or hypothetically but is capable of various interpretations, is in truth a "doctrinal function." In particular, is it not manifest that the various philosophies and religions are preeminently doctrinal functions? They are assuredly "postulate-systems" in their genesis, which are believed and declared true long before they are proved. They are built up mostly of value-judgments and "presuppose" some essential dogma which is an article of faith, though it is usually *camouflaged* as an "ultimate demand of reason." They always contain, moreover, "one or more undefined terms" (generally *more!*), as well as "at least one *element*, that is to say a thing or a substantive as distinguished from a relation." Moreover the great variability exhibited by philosophies and religions is well accounted for by their being "postulate-systems;" while the great variety of interpretations put upon an established system, like Idealism, Realism or Christianity, is natural enough if they are really "doctrinal functions," to which each believer can give the values most pleasing to himself. What is true of religions and philosophies applies also to political creeds and catchwords; they too are plainly "doctrinal functions."

2. Are there not a large number of persons many or all of whose beliefs are habitually "doctrinal functions?" For the meaning and value they attach to them appear to vary considerably with their circumstances, moods, temper and state of health.

¹ In this JOURNAL, XV., p. 262.